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Abstract: The security of database depends on a set of systems, roles, procedures, and processes that protect the entire database from
unintended activities. Unintended activities can be categorized as authenticated misuse, malicious attacks or inadvertent mistakes made
by authorized users. If any intruder succeeds in attacking the system network, the database security will be the last line of defense
in protecting confidentiality, availability, and integrity. This paper presents interactive multi-layer policies for securing relational
database that lies on the server side, monitor authorized users who may misuse their privileges on the client side, and monitor
database administrators who may use their multiple privileges to penetrate the security system. These multi-layer policies can be
combined together to create a defense system that puts the intruder under pressure at all security levels in order to protect integrity and
confidentiality of database.
Keywords: Database Security, Network Security, Multi-Layer Policies, and Defense System

1 Introduction
The security process in any organization depends mainly
on network security, physical security, and database
security. The network security is considered as the outer
security layer for protecting the system from external
intruders. The main backbone for securing the system
network is by using intrusion detection systems (IDS),
firewalls and by using secure socket layer (SSL) and
transport layer security (TLS). Physical security provides
a kind of access control measures to deny access to
unauthorized users. It can be used also to distinguish
between authorized and unauthorized users, detects
intrusions, and triggers appropriate responses with respect
to attacks.
All these security measures will be useless if the
attacks on the system were from inside. The inside
intruders can misuse their legitimate privileges to attack
confidential information inside database system. So,
database security is considered as the last line of defense
for securing database from external attackers and internal
intruders.
The
U.S.
security
magazine
”SECURE
CYBERSPACE” survey stated that, 89% of the users
∗ Corresponding

install a firewall, 60% of the users install intrusion
detection systems, but there are still 90% of the user’s
system security has been damaged [1]. Classical database
security relies on many different mechanisms and
techniques, including access control, information flow
control, network security, prevention of statistical
inference, data and user authentication, data encryption,
time-stamping, digital signatures, and other cryptographic
mechanisms and protocols [2].
The main idea of this paper is to present different
database security policies based on access control
mechanisms, cryptography techniques, and intrusion
detection systems. These policies are combined together
in a harmonious behavior to build multi-layer security
policies for protecting database from both legitimate users
and database administrators.
The contribution of this paper has the following
features:
–Provides security architecture for securing relational
database based on multi-layer security policies.
–The multi-layer policies can be used for securing
relational database that lies on the server side and
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monitor authorized users who may misuse their
privileges on the client side.
–The multi-layer policies can monitor database
administrators who may use their multiple privileges
to penetrate the security system by building a super
administrator that can trace any attack operations
from any administrator who are connected through the
system session.
–Reduces the overhead on database administrators by
providing controlled privileges to database users based
on the concept of separation of duty (SoD).

2 Related Work
Database security applications depend on three main
dimensions to provide a strong security system. These
dimensions are known as: Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability. Data confidentiality refers to the protection
of database from unauthorized disclosure and is enhanced
by using different database cryptographic techniques.
Data integrity refers to the prevention of unauthorized
users from modifying data and is enhanced by using
access control techniques. Data availability refers to the
capability of data to be available on the web even if there
is a system crash and is enhanced by machine learning
techniques [3].
The integrity of database can be maintained by using
access control mechanisms. Access control is the process
of mediating every request to resources and data
maintained by a system to determine whether this request
should be granted or denied. One of the recent researches
in access control is to build hierarchical access control on
database [4]. It proposes automated design method to
reduce the number of operations for user data spaces
creation. Leon Pan [5] presents a novel criterion-based
access control approach to deal with multilevel database
security. In this approach, authorization rules are
transformed to security criteria, security criterion
expressions, and security criterion subsets. Security
criterion expressions are associated with sub-objects to
serve as lock, and security criteria are associated with
users to serve as keys. Access control mechanisms are
used to grant access to some portion of data while the
remaining data kept private. Shyni et al [6] provides a
model for privacy protection in object relational database.
The key feature of this model is that it allows multiple
purposes to be associated with each data element and also
supports
explicit
prohibitions.
Access
control
mechanisms can be conducted also to web databases in a
model called RBAC+. The central idea of RBAC+
includes the concepts of application, application profile
and sub-application session when controlling the access
to web databases [7].
The confidentiality of database is enhanced by using
different cryptographic techniques that are applied to data
when it is stored on secondary storage or transmitted on a
network. Recently, the use of encryption techniques has

gained a lot of interest in the context of outsourced data
management. One of the recent achievements in
encrypting database is to provide mixed cryptography
operation over database [12]. It proposes a framework in
order to encrypt databases over un-trusted networks in a
mixed form using many keys owned by different parties.
The proposed framework is very useful in strengthening
the protection of sensitive data even if the database server
is attacked at multiple points from the inside or outside.
There are also different researches that have been targeted
on implementing cryptography algorithms for securing
database as presented in [13,14, 15,16]. There are
different policies have been presented for securing
database. The authors in [17] implement different policies
based on different types of access control mechanisms.
The authors in [18] provide a study on different types of
access control such as discretionary, mandatory, and
role-based access control. This paper provided advantages
and disadvantages on these access control types on
different applications.
All previous researches focused only on securing
database from external and internal users without
providing a way for protecting confidentiality and
integrity of database from database administrators. This
paper presents a comprehensive integration between
access control mechanisms, cryptography techniques and
intrusion detection systems for providing multi-layer
policies for protecting database. These multi-layer
policies monitor any intrusive behavior inside database
and make the intruder (user or database administrator)
under pressure at all levels of security policies.
This pressure is made by each policy that presents a
security point to protect database from a particular
dimension but each single policy can be penetrated by any
malicious database administrator or system user. This
problem can be solved by protecting each single policy
with the existence of another policy that provides a
second layer of security and so on.
The interconnected policies are combined together in
a harmonious behavior to provide a final database security
system based on multi-layer policies.

3 Security Architecture
Unlike database security frameworks that exist today,
which mostly detect imminent problems, generate an
alert, and produce a report, this architecture provides
different database security policies that protects database
from internal intruders while keeping the database in a
consistent state.
The database security architecture depends on the
super administrator (SA) who builds a number of N
database administrators who can connect to the database.
The super administrator (SA) also determines a number
of K shadows which are the minimum number of
database administrators (DBAs) who can manage and
control any transactions through the database server. A
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checking procedure is executed to determine if the
number of K DBAs is more than the number of N DBAs,
then a system error will rise to put the parameters again
such that the number of N K shadows must be less than or
equal to the number of N DBAs. Each policy will be
explained in detail in the following section.

4 Multi-Layer Security Policies
4.1 Super Admin Initiation Policy
Most database security researches are based on database
administrators (DBAs) who can control and manage
database transactions [8, 7, 3, 19] but the most challenging
problem is that the database admin may be the intruder
who can penetrate the database system resources based on
his wide privileges. So, a super admin (SA) must be
found to monitor all database administrators and control
their privileges.
The first policy starts by building a super admin (SA)
who manages and monitors all database administrators,
their users, and all data transmissions through database
server. If there are any intruders inside database whether
they are database administrators (DBAs) or legitimate
users, the super administrator will have the ability to
suspend or disconnect this malicious behavior. So, the
super admin is considered as a trusted third party (TTP)
that can be the manager of the organization or the owner
or creator of database. Once the super admin is created,
he starts building a number of K DBAs shadows by using
Lagrange interpolation polynomial secret key sharing
algorithm. The super admin determines the total number
of DBAs that are connected to the database server (N
DBAs), and the number of shadows (K DBAs). As
discussed in the previous section, the number of K
shadows is the minimum number of DBAs who can
manage any transaction through database server.
Lagrange interpolation polynomial secret key sharing
algorithm is presented as follows:
–If the database scheme contains N DBAs such that
any K DBAs shadows can combine together to
control the transmission process, the DBMS generates
the following polynomial equation:
F(x) = (axk−1 + bxk−2 + cxk−3 + · · · + nx0 ) mod p
(1)
Where (a, b, c,. . . , n) are random coefficients and p
is a prime number. These parameters are inserted into the
system by the super admin (SA). Any K shadows can be
used to create K equations by evaluating the polynomial at
n different points such that:
ki = F(xi )

(2)
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These secret keys must be kept private in a smart card
such that any K DBAs out of N DBAs can make a decision
for any policy modification.
Another important operation here is that the super
admin (SA) is only has the ability to classify database
users who are connect to the system from the client side.
The super admin (SA) provides the maximum number of
operations (insert-update-delete-select) allowed for each
user to differentiate between active, intermediate and
inactive users. For example, the super administrator fills
in the parameters for (Insert) operation as follows Insert:
Max (20), Active (15), Intermediate (8), Inactive (1). This
means that any active user can perform between 15 and
20 insert operations. Intermediate users can execute insert
operations ≥ 8 and < 15. Inactive users can execute insert
operations ≥ 1 and < 8.

4.2 User Profile Setup Policy
This policy represents the preparation of system
administrators to control and monitor data transmission of
users. In this stage, each database administrator from a
number of K DBAs uses the privileges granted to him
from the super admin (Policy 4.1) to enter his users
profiles, creating database roles, and granting each role to
a set of database users.
Once the database administrator fills in these
parameters, a request is sent to all K DBAs shadows
whether to grant or deny this request. The importance of
classifying users according to their activities on the
system arises to determine the suitable response action
that must be taken to stop the anomalous behavior from
harming the system.
The research in [8] presents a response action for
intrusion behavior when the intruder is the DBA but it
eliminates how to control malicious users and malicious
DBA at the same time. In addition, the research in [8]
provides a security policy for controlling DBAs in large
organizations but most organizations architectures are
small or medium. This means that there will be a small
number of DBAs or at most only one DBA, but there will
be a large number of users inside the organization. As a
result, there is a dire need to give the users of the
organization some controlled degree of freedom to
perform their actions.
This paper presents a complete vision of how to secure
the database system from inside intruders whether they are
legitimate users or DBAs. Different database systems that
depend mainly on modeling user profiles result in a large
false alarm rate [7]. So, Policy 4.3 provides a third layer of
security to control user profiles is presented.

4.3 Secret Sharing RBAC Policy
Role-based access control (RBAC) models represent
arguably the most important recent innovation in access
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control models. Under an RBAC model, all authorizations
needed to perform a given activity are granted to the role
associated with that activity, rather than being granted
directly to users [3].
The main problem is that if one of the users inside the
same role is a malicious user, then he will have a full
access to system resources granted to him as illustrated in
Figure 1.
Fig. 2: Secret Sharing RBAC

Table 1: Operations Priority

Fig. 1: Normal and Malicious Users inside RBAC

As presented in Figure 1, the malicious user (U6 ) can
perform any operation inside database depending on his
granted role and this will increase the false positive
operations. The simplest way to avoid this problem is to
give each user a specific role and specific operations
inside database that he can not deviate from it but this will
generate a great overhead on database administrators,
overhead on the remote server, and the size of database
will be increased.
This paper presents a novel policy to create a RBAC
for different users and then provide a secret authentication
parameter inside the same role for each user connects to
the remote server such that each user who wants to
perform a specified action inside database must share with
other users inside the same role according to his operation
priority (insert update delete select) to provide a final
signature to allow the transmission to be completed.
As presented in Figure 2, the malicious user (U6 ) must
pass through the authentication wall that resides on the
remote server to provide an authentication parameter in
order to proceed to his operation. This policy presents a
strong layer of security to monitor user behavior inside
the same role without the intervention of DBAs to
manage and control the operation. So, there will be no
overhead on database administrators or on remote server.
The authentication parameter that must be provided is
based on the priority of DML operations for each user
inside the same role. As presented in Table 1, the super
admin (SA) or a number of K DBAs will generate
different roles and pass these roles to different users. The
second step is to provide priority for each DML operation
the user can manipulate inside the same role.
Based on Table 1, if the malicious user (U6 ) wants to
perform (Insert) operation, then this will be his 3rd
priority. He must provide an authentication parameter

through the database administrator on the remote server
to the user(s) who have a higher insert priority (U5 or U7 ).
The user (U7 ) will lead the operation because he has the
1st priority. This is presented in Figure 3.

Fig. 3: Authentication parameter

As presented in Figure 3, user (U6 ) interacts with the
remote server by sending encrypted request using a secret
key (between user (U6 ) and the remote server). This
request contains the insert request from user (U6 ). The
remote server sends encrypted request to user (U7 ) using a
secret key (between user (U7 ) and the remote server) and
contains the insert request from user (U6 ).
User (U7 ) receives the request and verifies whether this
request should be granted or denied and sends the respond
to the remote server. Finally, the remote server passes the
respond from user (U7 ) to user (U6 ).
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4.4 Separation of Duty (SoD) Policy
This policy presents reinforcement to the architecture of
the previous policy. The policy presented in section 4.3
provides a security layer for monitoring user behavior but
the most challenging problem here is that policy 4.3 will be
time consuming especially when the user wants to perform
an urgent operation and the criteria of time is very critical
in it and any delay in this operation will make the operation
useless.
Policy 4.4 presents a support to policy 4.3 by
implementing policy 4.3 based on the classification of
database attributes. Database attributes can be classified
as normal attributes (An), sensitive attributes (As), and
most sensitive attributes (Ams). Normal attributes are part
of database columns in which there will be no harm when
there is a disclosure of data. Sensitive and most sensitive
attributes are part of database columns in which there will
be a great harm when there is a disclosure of data.
Many researchers present the process of classifying
database attributes bases on its sensitivity in order to
perform an encryption operation into it. Zhou et al [9]
presents a comprehensive view for encrypting database
based on database level, table level, record level, and
attribute level. Liu et al [10] presents a new paradigm for
database encryption in which database encryption can be
provided as a service to applications with seamless access
to encrypted database. Practically, the best way to
implement cryptographic techniques is through
encrypting sensitive fields only. This can reduce the
overhead on server processing and also the execution time
for performing encryption process.
This policy supports policy 4.3 by implementing it
based on sensitive and most sensitive attributes only. This
means that if the user needs to perform a specific action
on a normal attribute inside database, then policy 4.3 will
be deactivated and will pass the required action. If the
user needs to perform a specific action on a sensitive or
most sensitive attributes, then policy 4.3 will be activated
again and will ask for a secret key sharing.

4.5 Authorization Block Policy
This policy provides a fifth layer of security into which
an authorization data block is created in order to analyze
the user behavior inside database and compares it with the
stored user profile that was embedded inside database by
the super admin (SA) or the K DBAs. Any user behavior
that deviates from the stored user profile is considered as
malicious user.
As presented in Table 2, the monitoring block consists
of the following fields:
–Username: To determine the name of the user
connected to database.
–User Profile: To determine the classification of the
user based on his activity on database whether an
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active user, intermediate user, or inactive user as
presented in policy 4.2.
–Table/View Name: The name of the table or view that
the user performs his DML operations into it.
–Sensitive & Most Sensitive Attributes: The attributes
of database which the user will perform his operations
into it as presented in policy 4.4.
–Timestamp (T1, T2, T3, and T4): The time that the
DML operation will be executed based on the format
DD-MON-YYYY HH:MI:SS
–Insert: The number of insert operations allowed for
each user to perform inside database.
–Max Insert: The maximum number of insert
operations allowed for each user.
–The remaining attributes (update-Delete-Select) will
be on the same manner like the (Insert) attribute.

4.6 Intrusion Detection and Response Policy
With greater data integration, aggregation and sharing,
preventing data theft has become a big challenge, both
from outside and within. Standard database security
controls such as access control mechanisms,
authentication, encryption technologies and so forth are
not of much help when it comes to preventing data theft
from insiders [11].
The main objective of this policy is based on
identifying the maximum allowed number of insert,
update, delete, or select operations granted for each user
profile. Each time the user performs an insert operation
for instance, the (Insert) attribute in Table 2 will be
incremented by 1 until the (Insert) and (Max Insert)
attributes are equal. If the number of insert operations
(Insert) exceeds the maximum number of insert
operations allowed for each user (Max Insert), an alarm
will be raised determining that the user is an intrusive
user.
The intrusion response action on this intrusive
behavior will be based on the classification of the user
profile as presented in policy 4.2. Any active user (UA ) or
intermediate user (UIM ) who is detected as intrusive user
means that an aggressive action must be taken to
automatically disconnect his connection from the
application server. He will need to reconnect again but
under the control of the super admin (SA). Any inactive
user (UI ) who is detected as intrusive user will block or
suspend his profile from database server until the super
admin (SA) or a number of K DBAs deactivate the
suspension again.

4.7 Cryptography Policy
An additional layer of security can be combined to the
security architecture by encrypting the authorization
block in policy 4.5 in order not to give the user the ability
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Table 2: Authorization Block Processes

to change the policy itself by increasing his/her DML
operations.
The encryption process will be executed on the server
side by the super admin (SA) or a number of K DBAs
who share their secret key signatures using LaGrange
interpolation polynomial algorithm. The secret key
sharing is provided in order not to allow any single DBA
to perform the cryptography process alone.
The encryption process will be executed using AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm which is
considered as one of the modern algorithms in symmetric
cryptography.
The AES algorithm uses 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit
key size and plaintext block size of 128-bit. The super
admin (SA) or a number of K DBAs will be the only
trusted component that will generate the cryptography
process.

4.8 Authentication Factor Policy
The security architecture from policy 4.1 to policy 4.7
depends on securing database that lies on the server side
by monitoring different users and DBAs who are
performing actions on database. One of the major
challenges presented by kamra et al [8] is that there is a
dire need to provide a second factor of authentication that
will provide a second layer of defense when certain
anomalous actions are executed against critical system
resources on database.
Policy 4.8 deals with this problem and is considered
as the last layer of defense in protecting confidential data
from unintended activity or inadvertent mistakes made by
authorized users or DBAs.
This policy presents a second factor of authentication
by using hash function algorithm. A hash function accepts
a variable size message M as input and produces a fixedsize message called message digest as output.
The main mechanism as presented in Figure 4 depends
on executing the hash function (H) on the entire database
schema (Schema1 ) using secret key sharing of K DBAs or
the secret key of the super admin (SA).
The secret keys are generated by using LaGrange
interpolation polynomial algorithm to produce a fixed

Fig. 4: Authentication Process

length hash called (h1 ). The resulting ciphertext (C) is
stored on the server side.
If any intruder succeeded in passing all previous
policies and provides any modifications on the entire
database schema (Schema1 ), this will produce a new
database schema (Schema2 ). By implementing the hash
function (H) on the second schema (Schema2 ), this will
produce the second hash (h2 ).
When the K DBAs or the super admin (SA) wants to
retrieve the original database schema (Schema1 ), the
decryption process will be implemented on the ciphertext
(C) that was stored on the server side. A secret key
sharing must be generated again using LaGrange
interpolation polynomial algorithm to retrieve the original
hash (h1 ).
If there is no exact matching between the retrieved
hash (h1 ) and the modified hash (h2 ), then an intrusion
will be exist otherwise no intrusion will be found. The
main algorithm is presented as follows:
h1 = H (Schema1 , K)
h2 = H (Schema2 , K∗ )
Ds (C, K) = h1
If h1 = h2 No intrusion exist
If h1 6= h2 An intrusion exist
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5 Conclusion
Database security mechanisms and techniques remain
important goals in any data management systems whether
these systems are commercial, industrial, educational,
medical, or even military systems. This paper builds a
security architecture based on access control mechanisms,
cryptography techniques, and intrusion detection and
response systems. These mechanisms and techniques are
combined together to present an interactive multi-layer
policies for securing relational databases. The paper
provides a kind of security for monitoring and controlling
both legitimate users and database administrators to
protect database system from internal intruders.
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